All features Threat modeling

Security workflow

Planned

Find design mistakes while changes are still cheap.

Threat modeling is a planned Winfunc workflow for turning a design into a structured view of assets, trust boundaries, failure cases, mitigations, and focused questions for deeper investigation.

Threat modelingPlanned
01Design context
02threats and assumptions
03mitigation plan
Conceptual workflow · scope and review stay visible

The problem

Security work should end in a decision, not another queue.

Architecture choices create security assumptions long before a scanner has code to inspect. Teams need a practical way to review assets, actors, data flows, and trust boundaries while a design can still change.

WorkflowDesign context → threats and assumptions → mitigation plan

How it works

From scope to an engineering decision.

Bring a design document, system diagram, key actors, sensitive assets, expected data flows, and the feature decisions that are still open.

  1. 01
    Scope

    Map actors, valuable assets, data flows, and trust boundaries

  2. 02
    Investigate

    Review failure cases and the security assumptions behind the design

  3. 03
    Investigate

    Prioritize credible threats and practical mitigations

  4. 04
    Review

    Turn unresolved assumptions into code or hypothesis investigations

Review-ready output

What your team gets.

A trust-boundary map

Prioritized threats and failure cases

Mitigation options and open questions

Built for handoff

Evidence your team can inspect.

Keep the reviewed scope, supporting evidence, uncertainty, and next action together so security and engineering can make the same decision from the same context.

Measure the workflow

Track design issues resolved before implementation, mitigation completion, investigation questions closed, and security-related rework per feature.

Why it matters

Surface important design concerns earlier and reduce expensive security rework late in delivery.

Scope & limits

Planned. The model reflects supplied design context; it does not prove that an implementation is secure.